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Kant’s Feeling: Why a Judgment of Taste
is De Dicto Necessary
JOSÉ L. FERNÁNDEZ
Necessity can be ascribed not only to propositions, but also to feelings.1  In the Critiqueof Judgment (KdU), Immanuel Kant argues that a feeling of beauty is the necessary
satisfaction instantiated by the ‘free play’ of the cognitive faculties, which provides the
grounds for a judgment of taste (KdU 5:196, 217-19).  In contradistinction to the theoretical
necessity of the Critique of Pure Reason and the moral necessity of the Critique of Practical
Reason, the necessity assigned to a judgment of taste is exemplary necessity (KdU 5:237).
Necessity can also be assigned by employing the de re/de dicto distinction, namely, by
ascribing entailments of what must necessarily hold to either a thing (de re) or to a
proposition (de dicto).  Although Kant does not use the distinction in any of the three
Critiques, this omission has not prevented Kant scholars from applying the distinction in
their analyses of the first two Critiques.2  In this paper, I examine the role that modality
plays in Kant’s third Critique and I attempt to bring the de re/de dicto distinction to bear on
Kant’s famous aesthetic theory.  Ultimately, I perform a retrospective classification of the
modality of taste by arguing that because a judgment of taste is not a statement about an
objective fact, a judgment of ‘x is beautiful’ can only be read as de dicto necessary.
I
Imagine two people, Mme. Bongoût and Hr. Alltäglich, at New York City’s Metropolitan
Museum of Art looking at Johannes Vermeer’s Young Woman with a Water Pitcher (1662).
Each one feels that the painting is beautiful, and, having read Kant’s third Critique in
their university years, both hold their judgments to be necessary.  However, if we had
access to their subjective feelings, we would find an important difference between the
kind of necessity ascribed to their judgments.  Herr Alltäglich states that ‘Vermeer’s
painting is necessarily beautiful’; Madam Bongoût states that ‘Necessarily, Vermeer’s
painting is beautiful’.  The difference between the two judgments is that in Hr. Alltäglich’s
case, the necessity is de re (said of the thing); in Mme. Bongoût’s case, the necessity is de
dicto, (said of the dictum).  Only one of these necessary judgments is appropriate to the
peculiar subjective standpoint and feeling-exercising language of Kant’s aesthetic theory,
and in the sections that follow, we shall endeavor to reveal why only one of these two
judgments is faithful to Kant’s theory.
II
Kant distinguishes his theory of taste from his theories of knowledge and morality by
writing: “[A] judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment…but an aesthetic one” (KdU
5:203).  Cognitive judgments draw upon determinate concepts, which pertain to objects
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in the domains of nature and freedom.  Both of these domains are constituted by certain
laws: “Legislation through concepts of nature takes place through the understanding,
and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of freedom takes place through reason,
and is merely practical” (KdU 5:174).
However, in the Analytic of the Beautiful, which provides a checklist of conditions that
must be satisfied to formulate a judgment of taste, Kant carefully distinguishes the
necessity of this judgment from the necessity in theoretical and practical cognitive
judgments.  In contradistinction to cognitive judgments, which are based on determinate
or fixed concepts, a judgment of taste does not draw from determinate concepts because it
pertains to the subject’s “feeling of pleasure” (KdU 5:204), and is thus a reflective judgment.3
As presented below, the distinction between cognitive and reflective judgments tracks the
difference between determinate concepts, which attempt to subsume objects under the
categories of the understanding, and indeterminate concepts, which, if they attempted to
do the same, would find it a fruitless endeavor (eine fruchtlose Bemühung) (KdU 5:231).
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously stated: “Thoughts without content are
empty, intuitions without content are blind …. The understanding can intuit nothing,
the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification can cognition arise” (KrV A51-
B76).  Here, ‘content’ (Inhalt) is representational content, i.e., the objects represented by
our rule-bearing concepts (thoughts) and through the senses (intuitions).  Kant argues
that our knowledge of objects always takes the form of a judgment; however, before a
judgment is made, it must be formally cast.  For example, the judgments ‘The rose is red’
(KrV B70) and ‘The rose is fragrant’ (KdU 5:215) share a formal structure, they are both
cast in the subject-predicate form ‘The a is F’.
For Kant, however, beauty is not a property of objects and cannot be cast in a subject-
predicate form in which a exemplifies F-ness.  In order for a judgment to be grounded by
a concept, it must correspond to an object with determinate properties.  Objects comprise
the content of concepts, and the correspondence between a concept and an object is verified
by its relation to the actual facts.  The empirical necessity that Kant explicates between
concepts and objects in the First Critique is rearticulated in the Third Critique: “Objects of
concepts whose objective reality can be proved are matters of fact (res facti)” (KdU 5:468).
What, however, can count as the evidentiary criteria for an aesthetic judgment?  Nothing, for
Kant argues, “A judgment of taste…cannot be determined by bases of proof” (KdU 5:284).
This lack of empirical evidence is crucial for our understanding of the difference between
determinate and indeterminate concepts because in a judgment of taste there is no strict
correspondence between the judgment and a determinate concept.  Yet, although
judgments of taste are not formed from determinate concepts, and are indeed short of
providing res facti, such judgments nevertheless possess a standard for universally valid
aesthetic feeling, communicability, and agreement.  But what is this necessary standard,
and whence does feeling arise?
III
When Kant uses the term ‘feeling,’ he is not referring to any of the body’s five sensory
modalities: “If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation,
then this expression means something entirely different” (KdU 5:206).  According to
Kant’s aesthetic nomenclature, ‘feeling’ is a technical word with a connotation very
different than “an objective representation of the senses” (KdU 5:206).  Instead, ‘feeling’
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is the reflective satisfaction that grounds a judgment of taste (KdU 5:209).  Kant argues
that such judgments are facilitated (erleichterten) by the a priori constituents of “imagination
to combine the manifold of intuition, and understanding to provide the unity of the concept
uniting the [component] presentations” (KdU 5:217).
Kant calls this contemplative “mental state” the “free play of the faculties of cognition”
(KdU 5:218) that takes place within a judging subject and provides the grounds for a
feeling of beauty.  Consequently, the free-play takes place from a unique subjective
standpoint that does not aim to subsume objects under determinate concepts (KdU 5:217),
and its upshot aesthetic feeling is perceived with disinterest and without the presentation
of an end (Zweck), what Kant famously calls Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck or “purposiveness
without a purpose” (KdU 5:220).  Indeed, as Béatrice Longuenesse has put it, “aesthetic
judgment starts where the search for [determinate] concepts collapses.”4  However,
although there is no single determinate concept underlying a judgment of taste, our
experience still requires that an object appear as if it had an end designed for our awareness.
These subjectively purposive feelings and harmonious interactions of the free-play
provide the necessary grounds (KdU 5:237) that will be “valid for everyone and
consequently universally communicable” (KdU 5:218).  But it is precisely here that we
must inquire as to the nature of this necessity, and how it is underwritten.
IV
Kant considers the modality of taste in the Fourth Moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful.
He writes that, “This necessity is of a special kind” (KdU 5:237), and perhaps it will be
helpful to consider briefly what I call, respectively, the necessity of moments and the necessity
of feeling.  Kant’s feeling of beauty is, in a sense, both one and many.  It is one by virtue of
its unity and universality; it is many by virtue of the four conditions that must be satisfied
for the possibility of arriving at a judgment of taste.  These conditions are what might be
called the necessity of moments: in Quality, it is necessary that feelings of the beautiful be
disinterested (KdU 5:211); in Quantity, it is necessary that feelings of the beautiful be
without a determinate concept and liked universally (KdU 5:219); in Relation, it is necessary
that feelings of the beautiful be perceived as subjectively purposive (KdU 5:236); and in
Modality, it is necessary that feelings of the beautiful be capable of necessary satisfaction
(KdU 5:240).  All of these conditions are necessary insofar as the failure to obtain any one
moment renders a judgment of taste impossible.
The necessity of moments is a crucial, sine qua non feature of Kant’s aesthetic architectonic,
but it is not the only kind of necessary relations that make up a judgment of taste.  There is
also what might be called the necessity of feeling, or a de rigueur procedure in the constitution
of a judgment of taste, which exhibits its own kind of necessary connections.  Recall the
peculiar subjective standpoint of the free play, i.e., that the free play of the cognitive faculties
takes place within the judging subject, harmoniously quickens into a feeling of pleasure,
and provides the grounds for a judgment of taste, which will be valid for everyone and
universally communicable (KdU 5:221).  Thus we have what appears to be a threefold
schema of necessary entailments: (á) there is a necessary relationship between the free-
play of the cognitive faculties themselves (i.e., imagination and understanding); (â) there is
a necessary connection between the harmonious free-play and the concomitant feeling of
disinterested pleasure; and (ã), there is a necessary tie between the feeling of disinterested
pleasure and its expression as a judgment of taste.  Moreover, the transitive move from
(á) to (ã) is necessary insofar as (ã) would be impossible to obtain if not for the antecedent
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moves in the series.  In the following section, I should like to focus on how (ã) ties in with
yet another form of necessity, namely, the modality of taste.
V
The modality of taste is what Kant calls exemplary necessity, i.e., “a necessity of the
assent of everyone to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that
we are unable to state” (KdU 5:237).  Kant’s point about the modality of taste being “an
example of a universal rule” cannot be overstated.  Kant considers that because exemplary
necessity obtains the assent of everyone to a judgment of taste,
[everyone] must have a subjective principle, which determines only by feeling rather than
concepts, though nonetheless with universal validity, what is liked or disliked. Such a
principle, however, could only be regarded as a common sense (KdU 5:238).
In other words, the feeling ‘It is necessary that Vermeer’s Young Woman with a Water Pitcher
is beautiful’ makes a claim to universality by asserting that other subjects should find
this composition beautiful (KdU 5:237), which itself presupposes a principle through which
the subject possesses a sense for what we might call a feeling of inter-subjective
“pleasurability” or what ought to be pleasurable for other subjects with similar attunements
of the cognitive powers (KdU 5:238).  Subsequently, this “ought” is always “uttered
conditionally” (KdU 5:237), that is, on condition that we share in common the cognitive
faculties: “Only under the presupposition…that there is a common sense…the effect arising
from the free play of our cognitive powers…can a judgment of taste be made” (KdU 5:238).
Thus a principle of common sense is constitutionally required for a judgment of taste
to be any kind of statement that is grounded by aesthetic feeling and be universally
communicable.  Consequently, a judgment of taste necessarily presupposes common sense
as the subjective principle of the free-play, which is itself a necessary ground for an
aesthetic judgment.  On the basis of what has been said so far, it seems that common
sense provides the subject with a certain feeling that implies the possibility for others to
respond to a given representation as it does.
The inter-subjective moment of an aesthetic judgment is affirmed according to this
preliminary conception of common sense in which the subject puts others in its place.
However, this sense of common sense seems dangerously solipsistic because its conclusion
can portray the subject as an aesthetic narcissist that fails to consider the aesthetic feeling
of others in its judgment: “For although the principle [of common sense] is only subjective.
It would still be assumed as subjectively universal (an idea necessary for everyone)”
(KdU 5:239).
Fortunately, common sense receives further elaboration by Kant in his formulation of
the sensus communis:
we must take sensus communis to mean the idea of a sense shared [by all of us], i.e., a power
to judge that in reflecting takes account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone else’s way of
presenting [something], in order as it were to compare our own judgment with human
reason in general and thus escape the illusion that arises from the ease of mistaking subjective
and private conditions for objective ones (KdU 5:293).
Here Kant adds another component to common sense, namely, that by forming a judgment
of taste, we not only presuppose the assent of everyone else, but we also presuppose a
culture wherein we compare our own aesthetic judgments with the possible aesthetic
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judgments of others and thus “put ourselves in the position of everyone else” (KdU
5:294).  This sense of sensus communis compliments exemplary necessity by completing
the circle, as it were.  In the first account of common sense, we imagine others in our
place; in sensus communis, we put ourselves in the place of others.  This aesthetic enclosure
of judgment provides coherence by preventing exemplarity from dangling its feet off the
edge of a relativist de gustibus non est disputadum cliff; namely, by making intelligible the
possibility that others share aesthetic feeling just as we do by possessing the same power
of reflective judgment (KdU 5:341).
By tying exemplary necessity to the two senses of common sense, Kant attempts to
bring together the subjectively private and objectively public.  Thus there is a syncretism
between the common sense and the sensus communis that secures the reflective grounds
which can underwrite exemplarity’s inter-subjective necessity.
VI
After establishing the modality of taste, Kant proceeds to define beauty as that “which
is cognized without a concept as the object of necessary satisfaction” (KdU 5:240).
Therefore, since (i) what “is cognized without a [determinate] concept” can only be the
harmonious relational activity of the free-play, and since (ii) the free-play is the ground
for judgments of taste that are exemplarily necessary, then (iii) beauty is the necessary
satisfaction one feels in forming a judgment of taste.  Although a judgment of taste is
grounded in feeling, it is not a free-floating pronouncement without consideration of
some object; however, with regard to whether objects actually possess beauty, Kant argues
that a judgment of taste functions in an analogical sense, that is, as if the quality of beauty
were a real, objective property of the object being judged (KdU 5:212).  No determinate
object is beautiful in itself because beauty is not a property of objects; rather, if beauty is
to be “found” anywhere, it will be within the subject, namely, in the feeling of pleasure.
A judgment of taste does not pertain to determinate concepts that have objects as their
content because beauty is not a predicate of objects.  The statements ‘This rose is red’ and
‘This rose is beautiful’ are different judgments: the former draws from determinate
concepts; the latter from the free-play.  Also, because the necessity in a judgment of taste
is exemplary, it should be the case that if a judgment of beauty is affirmed by someone
having formed a feeling of pleasure, then that feeling stands as an example which the
subject demands others with similar reflective capacities to share in agreement.
Taste, then, pertains to this peculiar feeling, and not to pronouncements about a
representational object.  My argument here can be further elucidated by noting how
different ascriptions of necessity come to bear on Kant’s theory of taste.  In the following
section, we will see how the de re/de dicto distinction can be applied in Kant’s aesthetic
theory of judgment, and I will argue that for a judgment of taste to be coherently
understood, it must be read only as de dicto necessary.
VII
Recall our imagined visitors to the Metropolitan Museum of Art.  Both find Vermeer’s
painting necessarily beautiful.  For Hr. Alltäglich, the necessity is de re; for Mme. Bongoût,
it is de dicto.  In order to apply the de re/de dicto distinction to our study of Kant’s theory
of taste, we first have to establish that taste is expressed in language.  Fortunately, Kant
meets this criterion by stating that by forming a judgment of taste:
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one ascribes the satisfaction in an object to everyone, yet without grounding it in on a
concept…and that this claim to universal validity belongs so essentially to a judgment by
which we declare something to be beautiful that without thinking this it would never occur to
anyone to use the expression (KdU 5:214, my italics).
Hence a judgment of taste is expressed in a feeling-exercising language that, being reflective
and not cognitive, conveys to others the satisfaction one experiences before an object.
But here we can also ask: what kinds of statements are these “which we declare”?
When we express a judgment of taste, the representation goes together with a feeling
that we require others to share.  However, we should not interpret this expression in the
same way we would the expression ‘This rose is red’ because, as we have seen, a judgment
of taste, i.e., the expression ‘This rose is beautiful,” is not asserting something objectively
determinate about the rose:
The judgment of taste determines its object with regard to satisfaction (as beauty) with a
claim to the assent of everyone, as if it were objective.  To say “This flower is beautiful” is
the same as merely to repeat its own claim to everyone’s satisfaction…. Now what should
one infer from this except that beauty must be held to be a property of the flower itself…
And yet this is not how it is (KdU 5:282, my italics).
To say ‘x is beautiful’ is coterminous with the claim ‘I have a feeling of satisfaction related
to x that I require others to share, ceteris paribus, in relation to x as an example of a universal
rule which I cannot quite state.’  Importantly, Kant writes: “For we can generally say,
whether it is the beauty of nature or of art that is at issue: that is beautiful which pleases in
the mere judging (neither in sensation nor through a concept)” (KdU 5:306).  By “we can
generally say,” Kant is alluding to universal statements or, more precisely, the universality
that is expressed in judgments of taste.  Thus what Kant means by “we can generally say...that
is beautiful” is precisely the formulation I presented above with an emphasis on universality,
e.g., ‘I have a feeling of satisfaction related to x that I require others to share, ceteris paribus,
in relation to x as an example of a universal rule which I cannot quite state.’’
Consequently, a judgment of taste can be understood as the expression of aesthetic
feeling and its concomitant universal demand.  Necessity is ascribed to this expression as
follows: ‘It is necessary that I have a feeling of satisfaction related to x that I require others to
share, ceteris paribus, in relation to x as an example of a universal rule which I cannot quite
state.’  Or to contract the expression succinctly, ‘It is necessary that x is beautiful.’  These
statements do not have determinate objects and res facti as their truth-bearers; instead, a
judgment of taste expresses the feeling that arises from the free-play, and finds its necessary
entailments in the disinterested pleasure that others are required to share.  Having
elucidated the universal statements exemplified by judgments of taste, let us see how we
can apply the de re/de dicto distinction to these statements in Kant’s aesthetic theory.
VIII
The de re/de dicto distinction can be classified as follows.  With regard to ascribing
necessity, de re necessity applies to the thing; de dicto necessity is assigned to the whole
statement.5 Thus consider two competing judgments about Vermeer’s Young Woman with
a Water Pitcher (henceforth, YWWP):
1. It is necessary that YWWP is beautiful.
2. YWWP is necessarily beautiful.
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In sentence 1, the scope of the necessity is de dicto; in sentence 2, the scope is de re.  In
other words, in sentence 1 the necessity ranges over the proposition as a whole, and not
to the object YWWP, which, as we have seen, cannot, in Kant aesthetic theory, have the
property of beauty;  in sentence 2, however, the necessity falls on the subject of the
proposition, namely, YWWP.  Sentence 2 claims that it is Vermeer’s painting, the thing,
the res, which has the necessary entailment of beauty.  However, sentence 2 cannot be the
case because beauty does not belong to a determinate object, and YWWP is such a thing.
What makes YWWP a thing is, inter alia, its shape, color, texture, content, etc.  By making
the claim that ‘YWWP is necessarily beautiful,’ the compositional features of the painting
form a set of attributes that YWWP must have in order to satisfy this de re claim of beauty.6
However, all of these compositional features can be subsumed under determinate
concepts, and thus are anathema to a Kantian judgment of taste.  If a judgment of taste
does draw from concepts, they have to be indeterminate by virtue of being subjectively
purposive in reflection.
What is more, the de re necessary ascription of ‘beautiful’ in sentence 2 implies that
beauty is a trait of YWWP, something that contributes to YWWP being what it is.  This
ascription also has its problems.  Unlike YWWP’s other compositional features, all of
which are essential for YWWP to continue being YWWP, a pronouncement of, say, ‘ugly’
would do no harm to the res of YWWP.  Thus, the de re necessary ascription of beauty is
false, for the feeling of beauty (pleasure) or ugliness (aversion) is not an essential trait of
Vermeer’s painting.
However, the ascription of necessity in sentence 1, ‘It is necessary that YWWP is beautiful,’
which is a contraction for the expression, ‘It is necessary that I have a feeling of satisfaction
related to YWWP that I require others to share, ceteris paribus, in relation to YWWP as an
example of a universal rule which I cannot quite state,’ does not refer to YWWP directly,
nor to any of its compositional properties.  Instead, what sentence 1 expresses is a reflective
judgment that takes place within the judging subject, which in turn provides the
exemplary grounds for an aesthetic feeling that demands universal assent.  Necessity,
then, is ascribed to the feeling ‘YWWP is beautiful’, and not to the object YWWP.
Therefore, a Kantian expression of beauty can only be read as de dicto necessary. To
make a de re necessary ascription of beauty would be to assign beauty as a property of a
determinate object, but because a judgment of taste does not draw from determinate,
cognitive concepts that have objects as their content, a de re necessary ascription of beauty
would violate Kant’s theory.  So who is more faithful to Kant’s aesthetic theory, Mme.
Bongoût or Hr. Alltäglich? Mme. Bongoût, naturellement.
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Notes
1 Ascriptions of necessity apply not only to propositional contents but also to unpropositional contents.
Feelings, imagination, memory, emotions, etc., are examples of unpropositional contents. See
Pinto (2001: 17).
2 E.g., inter alios, Guyer (1987: esp. 140); Howell (1992: esp. 180-81); and Keller (1998: esp. 162).
3 A reflective judgment seeks to find a universal for a particular, and stands in contrast to a
determinate judgment, which works the other way around (KdU 5:179-80).
4 Longuenesse (2003: 146).
5 The use of this distinction has a long history going back at least to medieval philosophy: “The
first full use of the terms de re and de dicto is due to Thomas Aquinas, who was also the first to
define the terms syntactically …. Aquinas divides [a] sentence syntactically into the subject and
the predicate. The subject may be a full clause (in the de dicto case) or a thing (in the de re case).”
See Ezra Keshet and Florian Schwartz, “De Re/De Dicto“ in The Oxford Handbook of Reference, ed.
Jeanette Gundel and Barbara Abbott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 169-70.
6 Cf. Eddy M. Zemach’s (1997) discussion of an artwork’s “good-making features” in relation to its
ontology; esp.,116-21.
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